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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY A. MURPHY, dba ALEX PICKERING 
TRANSFER COMPANY, and PICKERING 




PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, REDMAN VAN & STORAGE 
COMPANY, BARTON TRUCK LINE, INC., 
UINTAH FREIGHTWAYS, MAGNA-GAR-
FIELD TRUCK LINE, PALMER BROTH-
ERS, INC., RIO GRANDE MOTOR WAY, 
INC., MILNE TRUCK LINES, INC., 
ASHWORTH TRANSFER, INC., BILLS 
MOVING, INC., A-ONE MOVING AND 
DELIVERY, LEWIS BROS. STAGE LINES 
and UTAH PACKAGE EXPRESS, INC., 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an original action brought in this Court pursuant 
to §54-7-16, U.C.A. 1953, to review an order of defendant 
Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission") which 
denied plaintiffs' application to transfer a motor carrier 
contract permit and certificate of convenience and necessity. 
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DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Commission's Order of October 30, 1974, 
(Commission Case No. 6750) denied plaintiffs' Application to 
transfer Contract Carrier Permit No. 130 and Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity No. 684 sub 1 from plaintiff 
Murphy to her wholly owned corporation, plaintiff Pickering 
(R. 54-7). 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiffs pray that the Commission's Order of October 
30, 1974, be reversed and remanded with direction that the 
Commission approve plaintiffs' Application for transfer, and 
that plaintiffs be awarded their costs from the other defendant 
carriers. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Murphy is a 92 year old widow who succeeded, 
pursuant to the Commission's Order of November 17, 1954, to 
the common and contract carrier rights of her deceased 
husband, John M. Murphy, issued May 16, 1936, and she now 
holds Contract Carrier Permit No. 130, issued by the 
Commission, authorizing her: 
"To operate as a contract motor carrier of all kinds of 
personal property, including merchandise, machinery 
and other property which she has occasion to carry in 
the course of the conduct of her transportation business 
within a 50-mile radius of Salt Lake City, excluding 
pickup and delivery service within the area described 
in Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 684", 
and she now holds Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 
No. 684 sub 1, issued by the Commission, authorizing her: 
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"To operate between all points and places in Salt Lake 
County and all points and places in Davis County south 
of the junction of U.S. Highways 89 and 91 just north of 
Farmington, Utah, but excluding from said area that 
portion of Salt Lake County which is both west of 4800 
West and south of 1300 South, but including the town of 
Kearns, Utah." (R. 57) 
In Murphy v. Public Service Commission, 30 U.2d 140, 
514 P.2d 804 (1972), this Court interpreted the foregoing 
Contract Carrier Permit to hold it is a general permit "not 
limited to a particular contract nor to hauling for a particular 
person." In so holding, this Court vacated the Commission's 
Order of July 10, 1972, in the Commission's Case No. 1863 (R. 
79-84, Special Record), which had held upon complaint filed by 
all of the carriers who are defendants in this action, that 
(1) the contract carrier authority granted Mrs. 
Murphy in 1954 was limited to those two shippers, 
Campbell Soup and Industrial Supply, for whom she had 
filed contracts in 1954; 
(2) that in order to serve additional shippers for 
whom she filed contracts in March, 1972, she must first 
comply with §54-6-8, U.C.A. 1953, in the same manner as 
if she were applying for a new contract carrier permit, by 
having the Commission determine, after notice and 
hearing, that the highways over which she would operate 
are not unduly burdened, that the granting of the 
application will not unduly interfere with the traveling 
public and will not be detrimental to the best interests of 
the public, and that existing transportation facilities do 
not provide reasonable or adequate service; and 
(3) that plaintiffs' failure to provide service for 
Industrial Supply constituted a forfeiture of right to 
reinstitute service without showing the service was 
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necessary or that she was not responsible for failure to 
give service. 
Plaintiff Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. is a Utah 
corporation, all of whose stock is owned by plaintiff Murphy 
(R. 2, 76, 161-2, 198). The other named defendants hold 
authority, from defendant Public Service Commission to 
operate as common motor carriers of property pursuant to 
certificates of convenience and necessity issued to them, 
which includes the carriage of property within the area 
encompassed in plaintiffs common and contract carrier 
authority, all of whom protested plaintiffs' subject transfer 
Application. 
On February 8, ,1973, plaintiffs Murphy and Pickering 
jointly executed and filed Application (R. 1-4) with the 
Commission which generally set out that: 
(a) Plaintiff Murphy holds the Common Carrier 
Certificate and Contract Carrier Permit as aforesaid. 
(b) Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. is a newly 
organized Utah corporation, all of whose stock is owned 
by plaintiff Murphy. 
(c) On March 1, 1972, plaintiff Murphy executed a 
written agreement, a copy of which was attached to the 
Application (R. 5-10), with Max W. Young, by which it 
was agreed: 
(i) After February 1, 1972, Mr. Young would 
manage Pickering Transfer Company for his own 
account; 
(ii) Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. would be 
formed and all of its stock would be issued to plaintiff 
Murphy; 
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(iii) Application would be filed with the 
Commission for approval of transfer of said Certifi-
cate and Permit to Pickering Transfer Company, 
Inc.; and 
(iv) Upon such approval, Mr. Young would 
purchase all of the stock of Pickering Transfer 
Company, Inc. and certain detailed equipment for 
$23,400, if the Commission approved the transfer of 
the Certificate and Permit, or $13,400 if only the 
Certificate transfer were approved, all on the terms 
and conditions set out in said agreement. 
(d) Plaintiff Murphy is 89 years old and it is 
necessary and desirable for her to sell her business. 
Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. is fit, willing and able 
to render said service and the public interest will not be 
adversely affected by granting the application for 
transfer of both the Certificate and Permit. 
That same agreement of February 1, 1972, was before the 
Commission as Exhibit 1 in the prior Case No. 1863 (Ex. 1, 
Vol. 2, Special Record). 
Hearing on the transfer application in Commission Case 
No. 6750 was held before the Commission on April 6, 1973. At 
that time the Commission's prior 1972 orders in Case No. 1863 
were in effect and on appeal. Defendant carriers appeared and 
did not protest transfer of the Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity, but did protest transfer of the Contract Carrier 
Permit. The record reflects (R. 159) defendants' counsel said: 
"Mr. Richards: We are not challenging the Common 
Carrier cartage Permit. I am sure that it is active and 
all of the criteria exist for a valid transfer. 
"Miss Warr: My clients have instructed me not to 
oppose any transfer of Mrs. Murphy's Certificate of 
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Convenience and Necessity with respect to cartage 
service." 
Both defense counsel stated their sole interest was as to the 
extent of Murphy's contract service for Campbell Soup 
Company since Murphy was not then serving Industrial 
Supply, so that if Murphy was not then serving Campbell 
Soup Company, there would be "no contract carrier authority 
subject to transfer" (R. 159-60). All parties stipulated that the 
Application to transfer the Contract Carrier Permit would be 
subject to this Court's determination in Case No. 1863 then on 
appeal as to the extent of the Contract Carrier Permit itself 
(R. 158-61). 
Both plaintiffs subscribed to the facts stated in the 
Application, as aforesaid, including the agreement that the 
Certificate and Permit would be transferred to the 
corporation, subject to Commission approval. Max W. Young, 
who joined in the Application, testified to all of the facts 
contained in the Application, as recited above, without 
objection or contradiction (R. 161-2). Detailed evidence was 
admitted as to the transferee corporation's financial condition 
and the operating equipment it would have (Ex. 1-3, R. 66-7, 
197-8), showing a net worth of $23,896 and nine vehicles, and 
no issue was made by any defendants that such was 
inadequate. Mr. Young, who would become the transferee 
corporation's executive officer, testified he was willing to 
conform to Commission rules and regulations in operating the 
business, and when asked to tell his experience, defense 
counsel said: 
"I am not going to challenge Mr. Young's experience 
in the motor carrier business — he is a very 
knowledgeable experienced individual in the 
business, per se" (R. 188-9). 
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Defendants crossexamined only as to the extent of 
service to Campbell Soup Company and put on no evidence of 
their own or contradictory evidence to plaintiffs' case. All 
parties rested and the Commission took the matter under 
advisement. 
In October, 1973, this Court's decision in Murphy v, 
PSCU, supra, was handed down in the Commission's Case No. 
1863. Defendant carriers petitioned the Commission to reopen 
this case (R. 21-4), and over plaintiffs' objection (R. 27-31), the 
Commission reopened the case for hearing on July 26,1974 (R. 
52). The Commission took notice of the proceedings in Case 
No. 1863 (three special volumes in this record), and this 
Court's decision thereon (R. 214). Defendants proposed to put 
on testimony that each carrier has made a substantial 
investment in plant and equipment to serve thfe territory 
involved in plaintiffs' contract carrier permit, that each 
depends upon traffic originating within that territory to 
support the remaining territory served and that each would 
be materially and adversely affected if the Permit were 
transferred. Plaintiffs objected to the admission of additional 
testimony on the grounds that no showing had been made as 
to need or basis, such as surprise, fraud, mistake or newly 
discovery evidence, for taking additional evidence when it was 
not offered at the first hearing (R. 209, 212-3, 218,222),'and 
objected that such testimony would be immaterial and 
irrelevant to the issues before the Commission on transfer, 
and that it was pure incompetent, self-serving speculation 
that the defendant carriers would be affected by the transfer 
(R. 219, 222). The Commission was not in position to rule upon 
plaintiffs' objections and took them under advisement (R. 221) 
and so, subject to those objections and rulings thereon, the 
parties stipulated that if each defendant carrier called a 
witness, the witness would so testify (R 222), The 
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Commission took notice of plaintiff Murphy's annual reports 
and shipper contracts filed with the Commission (R. 88-153, 
223) which clearly show an operating, functional business. The 
parties again rested and the case was again taken under 
advisement. 
On October 30, 1974, the Commission made and entered 
its Report and Order (R. 54-6) which concluded that before 
transfer of plaintiff Murphy's Contract Carrier Permit to her 
wholly owned corporation could be approved, she must first 
prove that existing transportation facilities do not provide 
reasonable and adequate service in the same manner as one 
applying for issuance of a new contract carrier permit under 
§54-6-8, U.C.A. 1953, and denied the Application for transfer 
of the Contract Carrier Permit. The Commission made no 
finding or conclusion that plaintiff Pickering Transfer 
Company, Inc. was not fit, ready, willing and able to operate 
either or both the Certificate or Permit, but concluded that it 
could not be determined if the transferee is ready, willing and 
able to operate the Certificate exclusive of the Permit, nor 
could contractual basis be found to determine the value of the 
Certificate independent of the value of the Permit, and for 
those sole reasons, denied the Application to transfer the 
Certificate without prejudice to reapplication to transfer the 
Certificate alone. 
Plaintiffs filed timely Petition for Rehearing (R. 58-60), 
and upon its denial (R. 64), filed timely Complaint before this 
Court which issued appropriate writ of review. 
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AlUUIMfiNT 
POINT I. 1WE COMMISSION ERRED IN CON-
CLUDING THAT THERE MUST BE PROOF THAT 
EXISTING TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES ARE 
INADEQUATE BEFORE A GENERAL CONTRACT 
PERMIT MA Y BE TRANSFERRED, 
The Commission concluded in its Report and Order (R. 
56): 
**Rule No. 3 of the Motor Carrier Rules and 
Regulations, (1937), which rule specifically deals 
with permits, expressly provides: the person 
desiring to assume said operating rights shall comply 
with the provisions of Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 
1935, as in filing for a new permit; . . . Additionally, 
applicants must demonstrate that existing 
transportation facilities do not provide adequate or 
reasonable service. Applicants have not met their 
burden of proof and the transfer of the contract 
carrier permit . . . should be denied,' 
rhis was the critical issue before the Commission, that is, 
in a contract carrier transfer application, as opposed to an 
application to issue a new contract carrier permit, must the 
applicant prove that existing transportation service is 
inadequate? Clearly, in application for a new permit, there 
must now be such proof. Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, did 
not originally so require, but in 1945 the statute was amended 
to add that requirement. Existing case law [Colleti v. Public 
Service Comm,t 116 Ut. 406, 211 P.2d 185 (1949); Morris v. 
Public Service Commission, 7 U.2d 167, 321 P.2d 644 (1958) ], 
makes it clear that in case of application to transfer a common 
carrier certificate, proof of public convenience and necessity is 
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not an element of proof, as it is on application for a new 
certificate, because that issue was decided when the 
certificate was first issued so that the only important question 
on transfer is the qualification of the proposed transferee. Is 
the law any different in applications to transfer contract 
carrier permits? 
Transfer applications are normally routine, since by logic 
and case law the questions of public need for the carrier 
service and correlative adequacy of existing service were 
decided when the certificate of convenience and necessity, in 
the case of a common carrier, or permit, in the case of a 
contract carrier, was first issued, leaving at issue on later 
application to transfer only questions of the transferee's 
financial ability, equipment, experience, fitness, willingness 
and ability to serve and the resulting effect on the public if the 
transfer is approved. 
In CoUett v. Public Service Commission, supra, Gould 
applied to transfer his certificate to Lang. Existing carriers 
protested and contended applicants were under the duty to 
show that public convenience and necessity require the 
service sought to be rendered by Lang. The Commission 
determined: 
" . . . This Commission has determined in a prior 
proceeding that public convenience and necessity 
require the services which Gould is authorized to 
perform under said Certificate. Lang proposes 
simply that he be authorized to enjoy the rights and 
discharge the obligations and duties of Gould. Lang 
seeks the right to perform those services which 
Gould is presently authorized to perform, nothing 
more. It having been determined by this Commission 
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that public convenience and necessity require such 
services, that question is not an issue in this case and 
need not be again determined. The motor carrier 
rules and regulations of this Commission now and 
since June 1,1937, in force and effect so provide; and 
the procedure of this Commission in cases such as 
this has been consistently in accordance therewith." 
This Court affirmed saying: 
"It would seem reasonable to believe from the 
following facts that public convenience and necessity 
does now exist for the continuance of the service con-
templated: An increase in carrier service is not 
contemplated by the application; only a substitution 
of certificate holders is contemplated; and public 
convenience and necessity has once been decided as 
existing, and has been recognized as continuing to 
exist to the present time by continuous exercise by 
Gould of his certificate rights, which had not been 
revoked prior to this hearing. The only important 
question under such circumstances is that of the 
qualification of the prospective new certificate holder 
to render the necessary public services. The question 
as to whether or not the opportunity to hold the 
newly issued certificate should be offered to existing 
certificate holders rather than a stranger is more a 
question of private interests than a question of public 
interest. If the Commission were restricted to 
present certificate holders, it might have a rather 
serious injurious effect upon the carrier who wishes 
to abandon his certificate and retire from business. 
His years spent in working up a good will would jtet 
him nothing, as no one would be interested in taking 
over where he leaves off. . ." 
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"The Commission took the view, that the 
principal question in such a problem as this is that of 
the financial status, fitness, willingness and ability of 
the proposed new certificate holder to carry on the 
business; that so far as the public is concerned, the 
public convenience and necessity would not be 
adversely affected by the change in certificate 
holders. The protestants made no effort to show that 
conditions had so changed that there was no 
necessity for Gould to continue in business. They 
really fear the competition of the Lang Company — 
that it will adversely affect their business — a matter 
that did not seem to bother them so long as Gould 
remained in business. . . . " 
"As to the matter of competition so emphatically 
emphasized by counsel for the protestants, we should 
not overlook the fact that in this case we are not 
dealing with an application, the granting of which, 
will increase the number of competitors in the field, 
and thus jeopardize the service to the public. We are 
dealing with merely a substitution of one carrier for 
another. . . ." 
(Emphasis added) 
In Morris v. Public Service Commission, supra, Watson 
applied to the Commission to transfer his certificate to Morris. 
Without giving notice that cancellation of the certificate would 
be considered at the hearing, the Commission denied the 
transfer application and cancelled the certificate. This Court 
reversed, saying: 
"Also the question of public convenience or necessity 
is not questioned in transfer cases since it is 
presumed such necessity was determined when the 
original certificate of convenience and necessity was 
issued. . . . " 
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"The purpose in proceedings as the one at bar 
have been described in the case of Collett v. Public 
Service Commission. There speaking of the cancella-
tion and reissuance of a* certificate of convenience and 
necessity to another party the court said: 
4
 * * * that the principal question in such a prob-
lem as this is that of the financial status, 
fitness, willingness and ability of the proposed 
new certificate holder to carry on the business: 
that so far as the public is concerned, the public 
convenience and necessity would not be 
adversely affected by the change in certificate 
holders.' 
"The Commission failed to make a finding as to 
the fitness of Morris, financially or otherwise, to 
assume Watson's certificate. There is-no reference 
made to Morris as to his qualifications, his 
equipment, willingness or the resulting effects to the 
public if the application were granted. In other 
words, the Commission has not indicated any reason 
for denying Morris' application because of Morris' 
position or shortcomings. 
"The Commission's denial of the Morris applica-
tion was based solely on the conclusion that the 
Watson certificate should be cancelled — a matter 
not properly before it. 
"The Commission's order are set aside and the 
case is remanded for action in conformity with this 
opinion." 
Logic compels the same rule be applied for transfer of 
permits, for the showing that "existing transportation 
facilities do not provide adequate or reasonable service" 
required by §54-6-8, U.C.A. 1953 on applications for new 
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contract carrier permits, was made and found existing when 
the permit was first issued, and has been recognized as 
continuing to exist to the present time by plaintiff Murphy's 
continuous exercise of her contract rights to time of hearing. 
The transferee corporation proposes only to assume her 
existing authority, nothing more. There cannot be an increase 
in carrier service as no change in the scope of authorized 
service is requested. Therefore, pursuant to the Collett case, 
"the only important question is the qualification of the 
prospective . . . holder to render the necessary public 
services." 
There is absolutely no case law or logic to support 
reasoning that on a contract transfer application, applicants 
must prove a new issue case. The Commission certainly did 
not require such proof in the 1954 hearing on Case No. 2945 
when the Contract Carrier Permit was transferred to Mrs. 
Murphy from her deceased husband's estate (Special Record 
R. 97-102), and there is no evidence that the Commission has 
ever required such proof in the past. 
At the first hearing on April 6, 1973, defendant carriers 
stated the sole issue was whether Mrs. Murphy was 
transporting as a contract carrier for Campbell Soup 
Company, arguing that if she was not, then there would be no 
contract carrier authority available to transfer; nevertheless, 
all parties stipulated that the Contract Carrier Permit 
transfer Application was subject to this Court's determination 
as to the extent of the Permit (R. 159-61). In Murphy v. Public 
Service Commission, supra, this Court held in October, 1973, 
that the Permit was general so that Mr. Murphy could enter 
into new contracts without obtaining Commission approval 
and without proving to the Commission that existing carrier 
service was inadequate. The necessary result of that decision 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was that Mrs. Murphy did have contract carrier authority 
extant under her Permit, regardless of whether or not she 
was then serving Campbell Soup Company, including the right 
to serve General Electric and Certified Warehouse, for whom 
she filed contracts in April, 1972 (R. 149-52) but which the 
Commission had ordered her to desist from serving, as well as 
the right to enter into new contracts. Notwithstanding that 
decision and defendants' stipulation, accepted by the 
Commission at the first hearing (R. 159-61), that the transfer 
Application was subject to that decision, defendants argued at 
the second hearing that Mrs. Murphy still must prove that 
existing carrier service is inadequate before the Permit may 
be transferred. Defendants argued to the Commission: 
"But there again I'm not going to urge the 
Commission in this proceeding to take the authority 
that is now held by Mary A. Murphy and cancel that 
authority or in any way alter or amend it in this 
proceeding. My whole position is that you cannot 
transfer it to that corporation or to any other person 
without the Applicants for transfer first making the 
showing as required by the statutes and by your own 
rules." 
Defendants' only position is a technical argument that 
Rule 3 of the Commission's Motor Carrier Rules and 
Regulations, promulgated June 1, 1937, dealing with transfer 
of. permits, provides "the person desiring to assume said 
operating rights shall comply with the provisions of Chapter 
65, Laws of Utah, 1935, as in filing for a new permit", whereas 
Rule 2, dealing with transfer of certificates of convenience and 
necessity provide that the applicants "will not be required to 
prove convenience and necessity". 
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, required applicants for 
new certificates of convenience and necessity to prove the 
public convenience and necessity required issuance of the 
certificate, but no such or similar requirement was then 
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placed upon applicants for contract carrier permits. It was not 
until 1945 that Chapter 105, Laws of Utah, 1945, added to the 
existing statute (76-5-21, U.C.A. 1943) that applicants for new 
contract carrier permits must prove "the existing 
transportation facilities do not provide adequate or reasonable 
service." 
Thus, Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, provided: 
"Section 6. Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity. 
". . . The commission, upon the filing of an application 
for such certificate, shall fix a time and place for 
hearing thereon, ...Ifthe commission finds from the 
evidence that the public convenience and necessity 
require the proposed service or any part thereof it 
may issue the certificate as prayed for, or issue it for 
the partial exercise only of the privilege sought, and 
may attach to the exercise of the right granted by 
such certificate such terms and conditions as in its 
judgment the public convenience and necessity may 
require, otherwise such certificate shall be denied. 
Before granting a certificate to a common motor 
carrier,"the commission shall take into consideration 
the financial ability of the applicant to properly 
perform the service sought under the certificate and 
also the character of the highway over which said 
common motor carrier proposes to operate and the 
effect thereon, and upon the traveling public using 
the same, and also the existing transportation 
facilities in the territory proposed to be served. If the 
commission finds that the applicant is financially 
unable to properly perform the service sought under 
the certificate, or that the highway over which he 
proposes to operate is already sufficiently burdened 
with traffic, or that the granting of the certificate 
applied for will be detrimental to the best interests of 
the people of the state 6i Utah, the commission shall 
not grant such certificate." 
(Emphasis added) 
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* * * 
' "Section 9. Contract Carrier Permit. 
"The commission upon the filing of an application 
for a contract motor carrier's permit by any other 
person than those referred to above in this section 
(meaning prior contract carriers) shall fix a time and 
place for hearing thereon and shall give the same 
notice as provided in section 6 hereof If, from all 
the testimony offered at said hearing, the 
commission shall determine that the highways over 
which the applicant desires to operate are not unduly 
burdened; that the granting of the application will 
not unduly interfere with the traveling public; and 
that the granting of the application will not be detri-
mental to the best interests of the people of the state 
of Utah and/or to the localities to be served, the 
commission shall grant such permit..." (parentheses 
ours) 
Section 9 of the Laws of 1935, as quoted, became Section 
76-5-21, U.C.A. 1943. Chapter 105, Laws of Utah, 1945, 
provided: 
"Section 3. Section Amended. 
Section 76-5-21 Utah Code Annotated 1943 is 
amended to read: 
"76-5-21. Contract Carrier—Intrastate Commerce-
Permit. 
* * * 
"The commission upon the filing of an application 
for a contract motor carrier's permit shall fix a time 
and place for hearing thereon and may give the same 
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notice as provided in section 76-5-18 hereof. If, from 
all the testimony offered at said hearing, the 
commission shall determine that the highways over 
which the applicant desires to operate are not unduly 
burdened; that the granting of the application will 
not unduly interfere with the traveling public; and 
that the granting of the application will not be 
detrimental to the best interests of the people of the 
state of Utah and/or to the localities to be served, 
and if the existing transportation facilities do not 
provide adequate or reasonable service, the 
commission shall grant such permit, "(emphasis 
added) 
The law has not since been amended. Section 54-Q-8, U.C.A. 
1953, is as last quoted. The history of amendments to the Utah 
Motor Vehicle Act is traced in Rowley v. Public Service 
Commission, 112 Utah 116, 185 P.2d 514 (1947). 
The Commission erred in concluding that the 1945 
amendment was incorporated into Commission Rule No. 3. 
Rule No. 3 refers only to Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, and 
not to subsequent amendments thereto. The same rules of 
construction and interpretation govern the construction and 
interpretation of administrative rules as apply to statutes; M. 
Kraus & Bros. v. U.S., 327 U.S. 614, 9ft L.Ed. 894, 66 S.Ct. 
705; 2 Am. Jur.2d, Administrative Law, §307, p. 135 City of 
Seattle v. Green, 51 Wash.2d 871, 322 P.2d 842, 844 (1958) 
holds: 
"The general rule is that when a statute is adopted 
by specific descriptive reference, the adoption takes 
the statute as it exists at that time, without subse-
quent amendments, but when the language of the 
adopting act evidence legislative intent to include 
subsequent amendments, courts will give effect to 
that intent." 
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See also Poison Logging Co. v U.S., 160 F.2d 712 (C.A. 9th, 
1947). State v. Dobson, 169 Ore. 546, 130 P.2d 939 (1942), 
cited the rule saying: 
"This is for the reason that the adopting statute 
'means the law as existing at the time of the 
adoption, and does not adopt any subsequent 
addition thereto or modification thereto'. Endlich, 
Interpretation of Statutes, p. 115, §85, p. 312 §233." 
Thus, Commission Rule 3, promulgated in 1937 as to the Laws 
of 1935, did not adopt the 1945 statutory amendment. 
" . . . Even where two acts are not in express terms 
repugnant, yet if the latter act covers the whole 
subject of the first, and embraces new provisions, 
plainly showing it was intended as a substitute for 
the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act." 
Dist. of Columbia v. Button, 143 U.S. 18, 27,12 S.Ct. 
369, 372, 36 L.Ed. 60. 
Here, the 1945 amendment covered the whole subject of new 
contract carrier applications and embraced the new 
requirement of showing inadequacy of existing service, 
repealing Commission Rule 3 to the extent the latter might be 
construed to require showing of inadequacy of existing 
contract carrier service on transfer applications. 
In Rowley v. Public Service Commission, s%pray this 
Court approved this quotation from Sutherland on Statutory 
Construction, §241, p. 320: 
"In the exposition of a statute the intention of 
the lawmaker will prevail over the literal sense of the 
terms; and its reason and intention will prevail over 
the strict letter. When the words are not explicit the 
intention is to be collected from the context, from the 
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occasion and necessity of the law; from the mischief 
felt, and the remedy in view; and the intention is to 
be taken or presumed according to what is consonant 
with reason and good discretion." 
Kesler & Sons Contraction Co. v. Utah State Division of 
Health, 30 U.2d 90, 513 P.2d 1017 (1973) held: 
uWe think the point where the court should refuse 
enforcement of such an administrative regulation is 
in accord with the usually applied rule of review and 
control of administrative actions: Where it so clearly 
transgresses beyond any reasonable justification in 
relation to its purpose that it should be deemed 
capricious and arbitrary." 
Reason and logic compel application of the Cottett case, 
supra, to this case. There simply is no reason why applicants 
for transfer of permits should be required to prove inadequacy 
of existing service when applicants for transfer of certificates 
are not so required. Here is Mrs. Murphy, an aged widow, 
who desires to sell her contract carrier permit. Now that she 
wishes to retire from business, she and her husband having 
spent years in working up good will, is she to net nothing, 
which would be the result, if she now has to prove that 
existing carrier service is inadequate. As noted in^Cantlay & 
Tanzola v. Public Service Commission, 120 Utah 217, 233 P.2d 
344 (1951), quoted on page 26 hereof, if existing services are 
adequate, it is because plaintiff has been providing a portion of 
the trucking service. It is obviously to the public interest, or 
perhaps more accurately, to her contractees' interests, that 
her contract carrier service be continued by a qualified 
transferee. Likewise, it is obvious that defendant carriers' 
protests arise only out of fear of continued competition; 
indeed, that was the thrust of the only evidence that 
defendant carriers offered, albeit immaterial and incompetent 
speculation. Defendants' counsel said (R. 210): 
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"Mr. Richards: . . . the evidence that I would 
contemplate offering would be to put on the 
witnesses . . . who will show the substantial adverse 
effect that the transfer of this naked contract carrier 
permit would have upon their existing operations." 
As in Peterson v. Public Service Commission, 1 U.2d 324, 
266 P.2d 497 (1954): 
"Under §54-6-4, U.C.A. 1953, vesting in the Commis-
sion power to regulate motor carriers, we do not find 
any authority either directly, or reasonably incident 
thereto, by which the Commission could arbitrarily 
refuse to approve a tariff, and, thus nullify the rights 
a carrier possesses under a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity." 
Thus, the Commission erred as a matter of law when it 
concluded that plaintiffs "must demonstrate that existing 
transportation facilities do not provide adequate or reasonable 
service." The Commission should have concluded that such 
proof is not required. Since the Commission denied the 
transfer application upon the erroneous conclusion that 
plaintiffs were required and failed to so prove, the Order 
should be reversed. 
POINT II. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING 
THERE WAS NO CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS. 
The Commission erred in Finding No. 2 that "per se there 
is no contract between Murphy and the Corporation" (R. 55). 
The contract between Murphy and Young, dated March 1, 
1972, was admitted in evidence as Exhibit 4 (R. 68-73). By that 
contract, the parties promised that the plaintiff transferee 
corporation would be formed with all stock to be issued to 
Mrs. Murphy (fl), that application would be filed with the 
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Commission to transfer the contract carrier permit and 
common carrier certificate to the corporation then to be 
formed (18), and that Mrs. Murphy would fully cooperate in 
the prosecution of the application (19). The corporation could 
not join the agreement because it was not then formed, but 
thereafter the corporation was formed (R. 76). The 
Application herein, paragraph 5, recites the same contract 
and its terms as aforesaid, and the corporation executed the 
Application, thereby ratifying and confirming the contract 
attached to the Application (R. 4). The Commission should 
have found that Murphy and the corporation contracted that 
her carrier certificate and permit would be transferred to the 
corporation, subject to approval of the Commission. 
Even if there were any deficiency in respect to the 
agreement between the transferor and the transferee, it 
would not make any difference to the granting of the 
Application, since the corporate transferee joined in the 
Application, and the Commission in its Conclusions did not 
conclude any such deficiency had any effect on the denial of 
the Application for transfer. 
POINT III. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING 
TO MAKE FINDINGS OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AS 
TO THE TRANSFEREE'S QUALIFICATIONS AND IN 
FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT THE TRANSFEREE WAS 
QUALIFIED. 
The Commission erred in Finding No. 3 in reciting that 
applicants' evidence consisted only of the Application (R. 1-4), 
financial statements (R. 66-8), equipment list (R. 66A) and the 
agreement (R. 68-73). Mr. Young testified, without 
contradiction (R. 160-2): 
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(a) Murphy is an 89 year old widow and it is 
necessary and desirable for her to arrange sale and 
transfer of the permit. 
(b) Young is experienced in the motor carrier 
business and will be active in the day-to-day operations of 
the corporation's business as its principal shareholder and 
president if the Application is approved. He is financially 
able to capitalize the corporation so that it will be in sound 
operating condition to render the service involved in the 
Certificate and Permit. 
(c) The plaintiff corporation is financially able to 
render the service authorized by the Certificate and 
Permit, is fit, willing and able to do so, and that public 
convenience and necessity will not be adversely affected 
by change in the Permit holder. 
Defendants admitted (R. 188) Mr. Young is a very 
knowledgeable, experienced individual in the motor carrier 
business. Young testified (R. 189) he is willing to conform to 
the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission (Tr. 35). 
TJie Commission took administrative notice of Pickering's 
annual reports, schedule of rates and charges, and contracts 
with various shippers that have been filed with the 
Commission and should have made findings with respect 
thereto. All of this evidence clearly proved that plaintiff 
Pickering is qualified to assume the extant operating 
authority. 
There is no contradictory evidence. Indeed, the 
defendant carriers did not contest Pickering's fitness, nor any 
of the other elements of the transfer application, as to Mrs. 
Murphy's Certificate of Convenience and Necessity. The 
Commission's Order denied the Certificate Application 
without prejudice on the sole grounds that it could not 
determine if the transferee was ready, willing and able to 
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operate the certificate without the permit, and that there was 
no agreement by which the value of the Permit and Certificate 
could be determined separately (even though the Agreement 
(Ex. 1) expressly contemplates a price of $23,400 if both 
authorities are transferred, or $13,400 is only the Certificate 
transfer be approved). Thus, by necessary implication, the 
Commission had to conclude that the transferee was qualified 
and fit. 
As stated in the Collett and Morris cases, supra, the 
elements of proof in the case of transfer of a certificate of 
convenience and necessity are: 
"The financial status, fitness, willingness and ability 
of the proposed new certificate holder; that so far as 
the public is concerned, the public convenience and 
necessity will not be adversely affected by change in 
certificate holders." 
Further: 
"The only important question under such circum-
stances is that of the qualification of the prospective 
certificate holder to render the necessary public 
services." 
In Salt Lake Transfer Co. v. Public Service Commission, 
11 U.2d 121, 355 P.2d 706 (1960), this Court said: 
"Realizing the limits of this court to review the 
orders of the Commission, nevertheless, if in relation 
to the facts before it, the Commission acts in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner, the order is 
without authority and must be set aside. Whatever 
the minimum quantity and quality of evidence 
necessary to justify administrative action, orders 
issued in the complete absence of factual support are 
clearly arbitrary, capricious and void." 
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"The Commission cannot refuse to believe competent, 
credible and uncontradicted evidence;" Lake Shore Motor 
Coach Lines, Inc. v. Wetting, <d\3M 114, 339P.2d 1011 (1959). 
Plaintiffs have clearly shown that the proposed corporate 
transferee is qualified to conduct the contract carrier 
authority without contradiction in the evidence and even 
without issue being made thereto by defendants or the 
Commission. Indeed, the transferee's qualification to operate 
the common carrier authority was conceded by defendants. 
Here the Commission made no finding that the transferee 
corporation was not, and should have found that it was, 
financially able, fit, willing and able to operate both the 
certificate and permit authority. The only testimony was that 
granting of the application would not be detrimental to the 
best interests of the public and to the localities to be served, 
and the Commission should have so found. Failure to so find 
and conclude as to those undisputed, uncontradicted facts was 
arbitrary and capricious on the Commission's part because had 
the Commission found or concluded to the contrary, such 
would have been arbitrary and capricious, given the utter 
absence of some competent evidence to find the transferee 
was not so qualified or that the transfer would be detrimental 
to the best interests of the public and the localities to be 
served. 
In Williams v. Public Service Commission, 29 U.2d 9, 504 
P.2d 34 (1972), this Court reversed the Commission's order 
denying application for convenience and necessity, saying: 
"If the only reasonable conclusion to be deduced from 
the findings would be to grant the application, then 
the refusal was arbitrary and capricious and should 
be reversed. . . . By analogy, the standard rule of 
review is applicable here: that the judgment or order 
must find support in the findings and conversely, 
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unless the findings support the judgment or order, it 
cannot stand." 
In Cantlay & Tanzola v. Public Service Commission, 120 
Utah 217, 233 P.2d 344 (1951), the Commission granted a 
contract motor carrier permit to Sanders to haul bulk 
petroleum products for Standard Oil from Salt Lake to Vernal, 
Sanders having conducted such haul for 20 prior years under 
slightly different arrangements authorized by a different 
contract carrier permit. The Commission found specifically 
that the highways over which Sanders proposed to operate 
were not unduly burdened, and that granting the application 
would not unduly interfere with the traveling public and 
would not be detrimental to the best interests of the public, as 
required by statute, but did not make a finding that existing 
transportation facilities were inadequate. Existing carriers 
appealed on the basis that the statute required the 
Commission to make a finding of inadequacy of existing 
service before the application could be granted. This Court 
noted: "The record is plain that the existing transportation 
facilities are adequate and reasonable for hauling bulk 
petroleum from Salt Lake to Vernal", but affirmed saying: 
"What protestants have overlooked is the fact that 
the applicant's service in transporting to Roosevelt 
and distributing from there to Vernal has been and 
currently is part of the existing transportation 
facilities to Vernal. By its combined procedure of 
operations applicant has served this shipper for 
several years. The existing facilities are adequate 
because I. Sander Inc. has been furnishing a portion 
of such trucking service. 
"The fourth provision (of the statute) states 
affirmatively that the Commission shall grant a 
26 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
permit when the existing facilities are not adequate. 
It does not, however, mandatorily require the 
Commission to deny a permit in every instance 
unless the four provisions are found in favor of the 
applicant." (Emphasis and brackets added) 
That is much the same case as here. Plaintiffs have shown 
without contradiction that the proposed transferee is qualified 
to conduct the contract carrier authority. If an element of a 
contract carrier permit transfer case is really introduction of 
evidence that granting of the application will not be 
detrimental to the best interests of the public, then upon 
uncontradicted showing that (1) the authority holder has in 
fact been operating the authority, (2) that the transferee is 
qualified to operate it, and (3) that because of the authority 
holder's age it is desirable that the authority be transferred so 
that she may retire, that ought to suffice as basis^for the 
Commission to conclude that granting of the application will 
not be detrimental to the best interests of the public, and any 
contrary conclusion would be, and is here, arbitrary and 
capricious, and should be reversed. 
Defendants argued to the Commission that no shipper 
witnesses supported the application. There is no such 
requirement for transfer applications. Moreover, Lake Shore 
Motor Lines v. Welling, supra, specifically affirmed grant of a 
common carrier certificate over protestants' objection that no 
shipper witnesses were required. Here, defendants made no 
such contention as to plaintiffs' common carrier authority. 
Consider plaintiffs particular contract carrier authority, 
being general and unlimited as to any particular shipper. 
Suppose plaintiff Murphy the day before hearing, had fulfilled 
all existing contracts, so that on the day of the transfer 
hearing, she in fact had no outstanding contracts; though she 
has a right to enter into contracts in the future without 
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Commission approval (Murphy v. Public Service Commission, 
supra,) would the fact that no shipper could that day support 
her transfer application mean she could not obtain 
Commission approval for transfer of her permit? Clearly not. 
That was then almost plaintiffs predicament as to her 
contract permit, for on hearing day on April 6, 1973, she was 
then subject to Commission order not to render contract 
service to her 1972 customers and permitting her only to serve 
two accounts whom she served in 1954, one of whom she then 
no longer served and the other she served only occasionally. 
Thus, this argument had no merit and the Commission did not 
make any finding or conclusion with respect to it. 
The Commission's "Findings of Fact" (R. 54-7) contain jio 
real findings. Paragraph 1 recites only Mrs. Murphy's 
authority; paragraph 2 recites the scope of the application 
and, as shown, erroneously concludes there was no contract 
per se between plaintiffs; paragraph 3 recites admission of 
financial statements and equipment lists without making 
findings as to what they contained, and a recital of 
speculative, irrelevant testimony as to the effect of granting 
the application to protestants, without stating plaintiffs 
objection thereto or the Commission's ruling thereon; 
paragraphs 4 and 5 merely state the parties' contentions and 
arguments. Thus, the Commission failed to make any 
appropriate Findings. The Commission's Conclusions do not 
relate to the Findings, but instead refer to the erroneous 
statement of law that applicants must prove that existing 
transportation facilities are inadequate, as well as prove the 
grant of application will not be detrimental to the best 
interests of the public. The Commission found no facts nor was 
there any evidence in the record, upon which to base the latter 
conclusion, and it is apparent that the latter conclusion and 
the Commission's ultimate order was based solely upon the 
erroneous former conclusion. 
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POINT IV. THIS COURT SHOULD DIRECT THE 
COMMISSION TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS9 APPLICATION 
AND SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF COSTS FROM 
DEFENDANT CARRIERS. 
Based upon the foregoing points, the Commission's Order 
of October 30, 1974, should be reversed. Because the 
uncontested, uncontradicted evidence shows plaintiffs' 
Application sh6uld have been granted, the Commission should 
be specifically directed to grant the Application, particularly 
considering the litigation that has thus far ensued. 
Thus, in 1972, in Williams v. Public Service Commission, 
supra, this Court reversed the Commission's Order denying 
plaintiffs' Application for Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity, saying: 
". . . we fail to see any basis in reason for the order 
denying plaintiffs application. Accordingly, it is 
reversed. Costs awarded to plaintiff as against 
protestant." 
Likewise, considering the litigation that has occurred and 
upon authority of the Williams case, plaintiffs should be 
awarded their costs from defendant carriers. 
CONCLUSION 
The only uncontradicted, uncontested evidence in the 
record was that Pickering Transfer Company, Inc., a wholly 
owned corporation of plaintiff Murphy, was fully qualified to 
assume the aged plaintiff Murphy's operating authority. The 
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Commission denied the transfer application upon the 
erroneous conclusion of law that applicants for transfer of an 
existing contract carrier permit must prove that existing 
transportation facilities are inadequate. The Commission's 
order should be reversed, with direction to the Commission to 
grant plaintiffs' Application, and plaintiffs should be awarded 
their costs from defendant carriers. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
By: Joseph J. Palmer 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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